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The Impact of Oil Price Shocks on the Economic Growth  
of Selected MENA1 Countries
M. Hakan Berument*, Nildag Basak Ceylan** and Nukhet Dogan***
This paper examines how oil price shocks affect the output growth of 
selected MENA countries that are considered either net exporters or net importers 
of this commodity, but are too small to affect oil prices. That an individual 
country’s economic performance does not affect world oil prices is imposed on 
the Vector Autoregressive setting as an identifying restriction. The estimates 
suggest that oil price increases have a statistically significant and positive effect 
on the outputs of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Syria, and 
the United Arab Emirates. However, oil price shocks do not appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on the outputs of Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. When we further decompose positive oil shocks 
such as oil demand and oil supply for the latter set of countries, oil supply shocks 
are associated with lower output growth but the effect of oil demand shocks on 
output remain positive. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Owing to its strategic nature, oil is an important commodity, affecting 
world economies. Fluctuations in world oil prices affect countries’ current ac-
count balances and government revenue. In addition to their effect on aggregates, 
oil price developments are held responsible for domestic price movements and 
economic growth, as well as issues related to labor markets. 
1. MENA is the abbreviation of “Middle East and North Africa”.
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Positive oil price shocks tend to affect the economies of oil-importing 
countries differently than oil-exporting countries. Oil price increases might be 
considered bad for oil-importing countries but good news for oil-exporting coun-
tries. The reverse might be expected for oil price decreases. 
The immediate effect of positive oil price shocks is to increase the cost 
of production for oil-importing countries. This is likely to decrease output, and its 
magnitude depends on the shape of the aggregate demand curve. Higher oil prices 
lower disposable income and this decreases consumption. Once the oil price in-
creases are perceived as permanent, private investments also decrease. Moreover, 
if the shocks are perceived as persistent, oil is used less in production, capital 
and labor productivity both decrease and potential output falls: the input cost ef-
fect.2 Various studies, such as those of Rasche and Tatom (1977, 1981), Darby 
(1982), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Hamilton (1983, 1996), Mork (1989), 
Santini (1985), Gisser and Goodwin (1986), and Lee et al. (1995) provide em-
pirical evidence that rising oil prices reduce output and increase inflation. As a 
result, tax revenues fall and budget deficits increase. Oil price changes also affect 
trade and exchange rates. Oil consumption is difficult to decrease in the short run 
for oil-importing countries. When oil prices increase, the inelastic demand curve 
for oil means total spending on oil imports increases. This puts pressure on the 
exchange rate and depreciates the local currency. This depreciation, in turn, may 
further affect economic performance. Even if depreciation increases the aggregate 
demand for oil-importing countries, prices may increase due to the exchange rate 
pass-through and lower output may occur due to higher input costs (see Kamin 
and Rogers, 2000, for elaboration on this issue). 
Oil production usually accounts for a large share of the GDP of oil-ex-
porting countries and oil price increases directly increase the country’s currency 
value (total oil production increases because the value of oil production increases: 
the income effect). However, the total effect of oil price shocks on economic 
performance mostly depends on what the oil producers (mostly governments) do 
with this additional revenue. Husain, Tazhibayeva and Ter-Martirosyan (2008) 
argue that oil prices affect economic performance through fiscal policy. Secondly, 
high oil prices increase real national income through higher export earnings, and 
create the terms-of-trade effect (see Kornonen et al., 2007). As a result, wealth 
will be transferred from oil-importing countries to oil-exporting countries, lead-
ing to greater purchasing power for economic agents of oil-exporting countries. 
Thirdly, even if appreciation of currency hurts the competitiveness of non-ener-
gy sectors, appreciated local currency that stems from higher oil revenues may 
stimulate investment and provide lower-priced imported intermediary products, 
which may stimulate production. Lastly, higher oil prices will also likely increase 
the profitability of the energy sector. This provides an opportunity for the in-
2. However, some authors, such as Okun (1975), Perry (1977), and Nordhaus (1980) argue that the 
cost-push effect of oil price shocks is limited because the economy-wide cost share of energy and the 
short-term elasticities of substituting between energy and other inputs are both quite small. However, 
Berument and Tasci (2002) notes that this effect will also depend on the degree of wage indexation.
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vestment and business sectors, with increased demand for labor and capital (see 
Bjørland, 2008). 
Systematic oil price studies can be traced back to the middle of the 1970s, 
when an abrupt rise in oil prices due to the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries) oil embargo was followed by a global recession. In fact, there 
is considerable literature, especially for relatively developed countries, that as-
sesses the effects of oil price hikes on economic activity and the channels through 
which they are transmitted. The empirical findings of the pioneering research-
ers of the US market, Rasche and Tatom (1977, 1981), Darby (1982), Hamilton 
(1983), Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Santini (1985), and Gisser and Goodwin 
(1986) report a clear negative correlation between oil prices and real output. 
The studies pertaining to non-US economies differ to a certain extent. 
For instance, Papapetrou (2001), examining the case of Greece using a Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model, reports a negative effect of real oil price changes on 
industrial production and employment. Similarly, Miguel, Manzano, and Martin-
Moreno (2003) study the case of Spain. They report a negative effect of oil prices 
on the country’s welfare. However, Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia (2003), who 
study 15 European countries, obtain different results depending on whether they 
used a world oil price index or a national real price of oil index. Moreover, they 
are unable to find any co-integrating long-run relationships between oil prices and 
economic activity except for Ireland and the United Kingdom. Therefore, they 
suggest that the impact of oil shocks on economic activity is limited to the short-
run. Levin and Loungani (1996) also report significant differences in the gross 
domestic product (GDP) response to oil price shocks for G7 countries. 
The effects of oil prices shocks on oil-exporting countries such as Cana-
da, Denmark, Norway, and the UK are examined in some studies, such as those by 
Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia (2003), Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005), and 
Mork, Olsen, and Mysen (1994). Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia (2003) analyze the 
impact of oil prices on industrial production for a set of countries, including oil-
exporting Denmark and the UK. They report that even if the correlation coefficient 
between output growth and oil price changes is positive for Denmark, and it is neg-
ative for the UK. The impulse responses suggest that oil price shocks negatively 
affect Danish industrial production but positively affect the UK production. Jimé-
nez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) examine its effect on real economic activity for 
Norway and the UK and report that oil price shocks adversely affect UK output but 
favorably affect the Norwegian output. Similar to Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez 
(2005), Mork, Olsen, and Mysen (1994) examine the correlations between oil-
price movements and GDP fluctuations. The correlation estimates show a general 
pattern of negative correlation between GDP growth and real oil price increases for 
Canada and the UK but the estimated correlation is positive for Norway. 
In addition to those studies of developed economies, some are performed 
on Saudi Arabia − a lesser-developed economy but a major oil-exporting country. 
In one of these studies, it is estimated that each one-US dollar oil price drop causes 
the Saudi economy to lose 2.5 billion US dollars of revenue annually (Brown and 
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Yucel, 2000). Another study indicates that Saudi oil policy influences world infla-
tion, which in turn contributes to Saudi inflation due to its imports (Aleisa and 
Dibooglu, 2002). This latter study finds that oil production shocks in the Saudi 
economy have a sizable effect on output through real exchange rate movements. 
Oil prices had their fourth rally in last three decades between 1999 and 
2008. Further research is needed on the effects of oil price movements, especially 
pertaining to developing countries. Such a study would not only fill the gap in oil 
macroeconomics literature but would also serve the needs of policy makers. As 
summarized above, the literature on oil is dominated by studies aiming to explore 
oil price changes, GDP growth, or the mechanisms which affect the economy of 
the United States. A proportionally fewer number of studies in the relevant litera-
ture, such as Bohi (1989), Levin and Loungani (1996), Cuñado and Pérez de Gra-
cia (2003), Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005), and Mork, Olsen, and Mysen 
(1994) deal with other developed countries, especially those in the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Even if the majority of 
these countries are oil importing, for the purposes of the studies, Canada, Den-
mark, Norway, and the UK were considered as oil exporting. Finally, a limited 
number of studies regarding this issue have been done on an oil-producing, non-
OECD economy – Saudi Arabia. In a setting where oil prices are on the rise and 
relevant studies about oil price effects on individual economies are limited, there 
is an urgent need to close the gap. 
This paper assesses the effect of oil price increases on a set of Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries. Studying this set of countries has vari-
ous advantages. Firstly, MENA countries consist of developing, less-developed, 
and least-developed countries and this study will fill the gap in the lack of evi-
dence from these types of countries. Secondly, the region includes both oil-ex-
porting and oil-importing developing economies. In such a structure, some of the 
economies in the region benefit from the windfall profits and fiscal revenues cre-
ated by the oil price hikes, while others (being net importers of oil) experience this 
situation as an additional burden on their economies. The opposite effect would be 
expected if a decrease in oil prices occurs.
In order to assess the effect of oil price increases on a set of Middle East 
and North African countries, we used the following proposition: that the countries 
considered are too small to affect oil prices with their economic performance but 
their economic performance will be affected by oil prices. This proposition will be 
used as an identifying restriction within a dynamic framework to analyze how oil 
prices will affect the prospective countries’ economic performances. In the current 
study, the exogeneity of world oil prices is assumed within a VAR framework with 
block exogeneity. In the model, oil prices affect the MENA countries’ economic 
performances but not vice versa. In order to capture the dynamics of world oil price 
shocks on these domestic economies, a four-variable VAR, composed of oil price, 
real exchange rate, inflation, and output growth is employed, as done in Kamin 
and Rogers (2000) and Berument and Pasaogullari (2003). Moreover, for a set of 
oil-importing countries, following Uhlig (2005) and Lippi and Nobili (2008), we 
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decompose oil price shocks as oil demand and oil supply shocks, and assess the 
effects of oil supply shocks on the economic performances of these countries.
With this motivation, this study aims to take a humble step towards filling 
the abovementioned gap in the field of oil macroeconomics as related to the MENA 
economies. This paper consists of five sections. The following section conveys the 
data sources, lists the selected MENA countries, and contains a brief overview of 
their economies. Section 3 lays out the econometric methodology that is used in 
this study, while Section 4 reports and discusses the empirical evidence gathered 
from the analyses. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes the study.
2. DATA AND THE SELECTED MENA ECONOMIES
As indicated in the preceding section, the MENA region is a unique labo-
ratory for the subject matter of this study as some of its constituent economies rely 
on oil export revenues, some are able to supplement their economies with limited 
domestic production, and others depend heavily on oil imports to meet their en-
ergy needs. These economies are interconnected through their labor markets and 
international trade linkages. However, since the aim of this study is to contribute 
to the oil macroeconomics literature in such a way as to emphasize the situation 
of the MENA economies with oil price taking behaviors, the economies to be 
studied are selected accordingly. Based on this rationale, this study elaborates on 
16 countries of the region: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE). Table 1 provides the data time spans used in the paper 
for each country. The data used in the study are annual. The real GDP figures 
used in the econometric analysis range from 1952 to 2005, and within this time 
frame each country’s specific period of analysis is determined by the availability 
of data. The GDP data are obtained either from the International Monetary Fund-
International Financial Statistics (IFS) or World Development Indicators (WDI) 
databases, depending on the availability. For Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Morocco, Qatar, and Oman, the nominal GDP values are obtained from 
IFS and deflated by the consumer price index data taken from IFS to calculate 
their real values. For Bahrain, Djibouti, Tunisia, and the UAE, the nominal GDP 
series is deflated by the GDP deflator, and both series are taken from WDI data-
base. For Jordan and Syria, the GDP series is deflated by the GDP deflators taken 
from the IFS databases. For Israel, the nominal GDP series is obtained from WDI 
and deflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) gathered from IFS. The exchange 
rate and world oil price data are also obtained from the IFS, where the world oil 
price corresponds to the Dubai Spot Price Index. The Dubai petroleum is medium 
Fateh 32° API, spot, f.o.b. gathered from Petroleum Market Intelligence, New 
York, International Crude Oil and Product Prices, Beirut, and Bloomberg Busi-
ness News. Before 1984, the index was Middle East Light 34° API, spot-obtained 
from Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, New York; and before 1974, it was Saudi 
Arabian Light 34° API, posted price, ex Ras Tanura taken from Platt’s Oil Price 
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Handbook and Almanac, New York. The code of this index in IFS is 46676aaz. 
Table 1. Time Span Used for the Analyses
Countries Time span Countries Time span
Algeria 1969-2003 Kuwait 1972-2004 
Bahrain 1980-2004 Libya 1964-2004 
Djibouti 1987-2004 Morocco 1952-2005 
Egypt 1952-2005 Oman 1965-2003 
Iran 1959-2004 Qatar 1979-2004 
Iraq 1953-1978 Syria 1963-2002 
Israel 1983-2004 Tunisia 1965-2004 
Jordan 1976-2003 UAE 1973-2004
In order to observe the role of oil in the selected MENA economies, we 
calculated a set of statistics on oil. Table 2 lists the abbreviations of each variable 
that we use in this study. Table 3 reports the sample averages of OE/OP (ratio of 
Oil Exports to Crude Oil Production) for the time period between 1992 and 2004, 
and NOI/GDP (ratio of Net Oil Imports to the GDP) for the time period between 
1971 and 2000, along with their variances and their maximum and minimum val-
ues. When these two ratios are examined closely, some countries appear as oil-
exporting countries even if they are not generally considered to be oil exporting; 
for example, Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia. These countries provide a supply of crude 
oil domestically and even export a portion of it. This picture is confirmed by the 
relevant NOI/GDP figure. Moreover, Bahrain appears as a relatively small and 
net oil-exporting economy. This result could be attributed to its relatively low 
NOI/GDP ratio, which is just above that of Egypt.3 Lastly, while NOI/GDP maxi-
mum and minimum values for Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Oman, Qatar, and the UAE are always negative, for Israel, Jordan, and Morocco 
they are always positive. Thus, for the sample which we consider, this suggests 
that the former set of countries is always net oil-exporting, whereas the latter set 
of countries is always net oil-importing. Their extreme values indicate that there is 
no change in the oil exporting/importing status of the sample countries. 
Table 2. Definitions of Variables
Variable  Definition
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
OE/OP Ratio of Oil Exports to Crude Oil Production 













3. Bahrain depends on Saudi Arabia for oil granted as aid (see World Fact Book, 2007).
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Table 3. Basic Magnitudes of the Sample Averages of the Countries  
of Interest 
 OE/OP NOI/GDP
 Mean Min. Max. Var. Mean Min. Max. Var.
Algeria 57.02 53.66 66.24 12.96 -1.38 -2.38 -1.16 0.14 
Bahrain 4.22 0.00 9.91 21.94 -0.47 -1.64 -0.16 0.15 
Djibouti --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Egypt 22.44 2.88 43.8 256.27 -0.33 -0.58 -0.07 0.03 
Iran 65.59 58.08 72.73 28.95 -1.85 -4.91 -0.78 1.36 
Iraq 43.86 11.3 80.71 1098.21 -0.53 -1.43 -0.04 0.20 
Israel 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.01 0.19 0.002 
Jordan 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.32 0.73 0.011 
Kuwait 62.39 50.26 83.24 110.13 -3.51 -5.96 -0.70 1.34 
Libya 76.40 72.21 81.82 10.34 -1.90 -2.91 -1.25 0.18 
Morocco 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.00 
Oman 92.60 91.49 93.85 0.76 -3.84 -6.34 -3.27 0.76 
Qatar 85.98 81.27 92.08 18.04 -2.95 -4.62 -2.23 0.61 
Syria 56.27 48.50 60.45 15.09 -1.21 -1.70 -0.02 0.22 
Tunisia 75.50 66.70 82.24 26.99 -0.13 -0.46 0.00 0.02 
UAE 83.30 76.05 89.74 25.02 -2.66 -7.03 -1.89 1.68
Source: Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1996-1997, 1997-1998, 
1998-1999, 1999-2000, www.iea.org. 
The OE/OP values are average values from 1992-2004. 
The NOI/GDP values are average values from 1971-2000.
2.1 Developments in Oil Prices and Incomes
Figures 1 to 4 show the composition of the various groups for which 
we plot an individual country’s logarithm of the real GDP and the logarithm 
of real world oil prices, where each series is normalized at 1980 (or its closest 
year) to be equal to one. The first and the second groups consist of the Middle 
East countries that export and import oil, respectively. The third and the fourth 
groups are comprised of the North African countries that export and import oil, 
respectively. We calculate the real world oil prices by deflating the US dollar 
value of the oil price index with the US All Urban Consumer Price Index. The 
countries are divided into four categories here. The first group of countries 
consists of Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. In the second 
group, we have Israel, Jordan, and Syria. Algeria and Libya are considered 
the third group; Djibouti, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are considered the 
fourth group. 
Figure 1 suggests that the GDPs of Qatar and the UAE move along with 
the oil price for the post-1980 period. The GDP of Kuwait moves almost one-
to-one with the world oil price. With a few exceptions, the GDP of Iran can be 
considered to move with the oil price. The GDP of Iraq does not seem to move in 
line with the oil prices, which might be due to the lack of data. For the post-2000 
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Figure 1. The Log Real GDPs of the Group I Countries
Figure 2. The Log Real GDPs of the Group II Countries
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Figure 3. The Log Real GDPs of the Group III Countries
Figure 4. The Log Real GDPs of the Group IV Countries
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period, the GDPs of the countries increase as the oil price increases. Oman has 
an increasing GDP trend and it seems that the oil price drop in the 1980s did not 
affect its economic performance.
In Figure 2, the movements of the logarithm of real oil prices and the 
logarithm of the real GDPs of Israel, Jordan, and Syria are shown. The downward 
trend of oil prices between 1960 and 1970 is associated with higher Syrian output. 
The decreasing trend of oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s is associated with higher 
output for Israel, Jordan, and Syria but increasing oil prices decreased the growth 
rate of income for these countries. 
Figure 3 shows movements in oil prices and the real GDPs of North Af-
rican countries that export oil. With the exception of the 1960s, the GDP of Libya 
seems to move with the world oil price. Although the relationship between oil 
prices and the GDP is positive for Algeria for the 1970s and 2000s, this relation-
ship is negative for the 1980s and 1990s. 
Figure 4 indicates the movements of the oil prices and the logarithms 
of the real GDPs of Djibouti, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. The GDPs of Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia have an increasing trend starting from 1952 regardless of 
changes in oil prices. The data on Djibouti (available only after 1987) move with 
the oil prices. 
2.2. Relationships Between Oil Prices and GDPs
In order to assess the relationship between world oil prices and indi-
vidual countries’ economic performances, two sets of analyses were performed 
as an initial step. Panel A of Table 4 reports the estimated coefficient of world 
oil real price growth when real GDP growth is regressed on a constant term and 
world oil real price growth.4 The estimated coefficients are positive for all 16 
countries and statistically significant at the 5% level for eight of them. The high-
est coefficients are for Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Libya, and Algeria. Even though these 
coefficients make sense for some oil-exporting countries, positive coefficients for 
oil-importing countries such as Djibouti, Israel, and Jordan are puzzling. Vari-
ous reasons for these results might include the following: 1. The Ordinary Least 
Squares estimates cannot capture the effects of oil price changes on economies 
across time. Oil price shocks may affect output next year but not this year. 2. Out-
put and oil prices may not capture the dynamics of the economy. We may need to 
observe the effects of oil prices on output after accounting for other factors such 
as the dynamics of output, inflation, real exchange rate, and even oil prices them-
4. When the logarithm of real oil prices and each real GDP series have a single unit root and if 
these series are cointegrated, then the OLS estimate between these two variables is admissible. For 
most of the countries, Table A1 of the Appendix indeed shows the presence of a unit root of these 
series but the cointegrations between the logarithm of the real oil prices and the logarithm of real GDP 
for each country are not present. Thus, we report the estimate in their first logarithmic differences in 
this subsection. 
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selves. In order to account for the dynamic relationship, we calculated cross cor-
relation between oil price growth rate and the growth rate of each country for five 
years; the estimates are reported in Panel B of Table 4. For the contemporaneous 
correlations, the coefficients are all positive. When we look at the cross correla-
tion between current real oil price growth and the following year’s GDP growth, 
the coefficients are negative for 10 countries, but none of them are statistically 
significant at the 10%level. An examination of the cross correlation across other 
periods reveals that they are mostly not statistically significant and a general pat-
tern could not be detected. 
Table 4. Relationships between Oil Prices and Economic Performance
 Panel A: Panel B: Panel C: 
  OLS  Cross Correlations  OLS
       Contemp. 
Country 0 1 2 3 4 5 Imp. Resp.
Algeria 0.243*** 0.817* -0.028 0.007 -0.084 -0.035 0.321 12.321* 
Bahrain 0.031 0.162 0.164 0.048 0.160 0.244 -0.195 0.031 
Djibouti 0.004 0.071 0.237 0.277 -0.048 0.005 0.066 -0.033 
Egypt 0.047* 0.168 -0.079 0.136 0.077 -0.056 -0.050 0.962 
Iran 0.221*** 0.583* 0.140 0.042 0.230 -0.017 0.230 7.325* 
Iraq 0.450*** 0.924* -0.081 -0.139 -0.004 -0.091 -0.091 18.379* 
Israel 0.007 0.097 0.180 -0.217 0.053 0.057 0.009 -0.376 
Jordan 0.038 0.266 0.172 0.009 -0.003 -0.110 -0.175 1.736 
Kuwait 0.509*** 0.901* -0.006 -0.054 0.015 -0.078 0.283 25.035* 
Libya 0.385*** 0.616* -0.011 0.052 0.173 0.0006 0.177 14.790* 
Morocco 0.009 0.174 0.033 0.030 0.062 0.060 0.352* 0.970 
Oman 0.011 0.056 -0.262 -0.016 -0.073 0.033 0.184 -0.351 
Qatar 0.421*** 0.758* -0.055 0.033 0.289 0.055 0.063 12.669* 
Syria 0.050 0.279 -0.286 0.405* 0.039 -0.057 0.386* 1.914 
Tunisia 0.039** 0.271 -0.259 0.425* 0.304* 0.127 0.088 0.825 
UAE 0.154*** 0.445* -0.054 0.072 0.082 -0.046 0.083 7.154*
*** indicates the level of significance at 1%. 
** indicates the level of significance at 5%. 
* indicates the level of significance at 10%.
Even if the cross correlations account for the dynamic effects of oil price 
increases on the real GDP, it does not control for other factors that affect domes-
tic economic performance; this might be the reason for low test statistics for the 
cross correlation. In order to account for these, we will use a version of Kamin and 
Roger’s (2000) VAR approach, but as an identification restriction, our model will 
introduce the proposition that world oil prices affect each country’s economic per-
formance but the economic performance of each country will not affect world oil 
prices. Therefore, our model uses a relatively large set of conditioning informa-
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tion that controls for the potential confounding of other factors such as inflation, 
real exchange rate, and the role of a country in affecting world oil prices. The next 
section elaborates on a model that incorporates these propositions. The estimates 
on Panel C will be elaborated on later in the text. 
3. METHODOLOGY
In order to capture the dynamics of each country’s economic perfor-
mance, we adopt the three-variable VAR model of Kamin and Rogers (2000). 
The VAR model consists of each country’s real exchange rate, inflation, and 
output growth.5 The MENA countries that we consider are small enough not to 
affect world oil prices.6 Thus, we used a similar Structural Vector Autoregres-
sive (SVAR) model as suggested by Cushman and Zha (1997). In this structural 
(block recursive) model, we allow as an exogenous variable that oil prices affect 
the MENA countries’ economic performance variables: real exchange rate, infla-
tion, and output growth. However, we assume that these three domestic economic 
performance variables of each country cannot affect the world oil prices. Here, 
this four-variable VAR setup is different from the conventional four-variable VAR 
system in that none of the MENA countries’ economic variables enter the oil price 
specification but the economic variables of the MENA countries are affected by 
the current and lag values of world oil prices. 
The identified VAR model suggested by Cushman and Zha (1997) might 
be denoted as: 
 (1)
where A(L) is an mxm matrix polynomial in the lag operator L, y(t) is the mx1 
observations vector, and e(t) is the mx1 vector of structural disturbances. The 
specification of the model is as follows:
 (2)
 
Here, A(0) is non-singular and innovations e(t) are assumed to be uncor-
related with y(t–j) for j > 0. The block (y
1
(t))’s exogeneity is represented by A
12
(L) 
that is zero. It can be said that y
1
(t) is affected neither by y
2
(t) contemporaneously 
nor lag values of y
2
(t). On the other hand, A
21
(L) is not restricted to zero, so the 
5. We could use more complete models to capture the dynamics of domestic economic performance, 
but lack of data and short data spans did not allow us to use a richer set of models. 
6. In this paper, the 16 MENA countries mentioned in Section 2 are analyzed with regards to the 
effects of oil price shocks on their economies. As implied above, the Saudi Arabian case is excluded 
from the analysis as it is an oil-exporting country with the capacity of an oil price setter. Due to the 
unavailability of data, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen are also excluded. 
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model specification allows oil prices to affect the domestic economy both contem-
poraneously as well as with lags.7
The observation matrices are y
1
= [World oil price], y
2
= [MENA coun-
tries’ real exchange rates, inflation, output growth]. For each MENA country, the 
lag order of the identified VAR model is 1, as suggested by the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criteria.
In order to get orthogonalized residuals, we used the Cholesky decom-
position in the second block y
2
. The ordering of the variables is important. The 
first variable is the real exchange rate. This implies that the real exchange rate 
is affected by its own lags but not affected by the contemporaneous shocks of 
inflation and growth. The next variable, inflation, is assumed not to affect the real 
exchange rate but is assumed to be affected by the real exchange rate contempora-
neously. Output growth is the third variable in the ordering which is considered to 
be affected by the other two variables contemporaneously, but not vice versa. In 
addition, the variables affect each other with lags. The order of the variables in the 
VAR model is similar to the studies of Kamin and Rogers (2000) and Berument 
and Pasaogullari (2003). 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Using the SVAR model as introduced in the previous section, the im-
pulse response functions of each MENA country are estimated by using annual 
data for the general period of 1952-2005. The real exchange rate is calculated as 
[(exchange rate * USA CPI) / domestic price level], growth is the first difference 
of the logarithm of the real GDPs and inflation is the first difference of the loga-
rithm of domestic price levels.
The impulse responses for the set of MENA countries are reported in 
Figure 5. The impulse responses are obtained by giving a one-standard deviation 
shock (39.57) in the world oil price for the series of the real GDP growth of each 
country8. In order to calculate the confidence interval bands, we adopt the Bayes-
ian inference method of Zha (1999), with 2500 iterations. The confidence bands 
are reported at the 95% confidence levels. The middle lines in the figures represent 
the impulse responses. The confidence bands are reported as dotted lines. When 
the horizontal line falls into the confidence interval, then the null hypothesis that 
there is no effect of oil price shocks on output growth cannot be rejected. Thus, 
including the horizontal line for the particular time period obtained in this manner 
is interpreted as evidence of statistical insignificance.
7. Using conventional VAR specification with the Cholesky decomposition would allow shocks 
in the domestic economy that would not affect oil prices contemporaneously but would affect the 
world oil prices with lags. However, with block exogeneity, shocks to the domestic economy would 
affect world oil prices neither contemporaneously nor with lags. We believe that the lag values of 
economic indicators will not affect oil prices, which is a reasonable assumption. To save space, the 
above estimates are not reported here, however, they are available from the authors upon request.
8. See Enders (1995; 305-312) for impulse responses for VAR specifications.
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Figure 5. The Effects of One Standard Deviation Shocks to Oil Prices  
on Output
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Figure 5. The Effects of One Standard Deviation Shocks to Oil Prices  
on Output (continued)
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When the test results of each country are considered, it is observed that 
one standard deviation shock in oil prices has statistically significant, contempo-
raneous, and positive effects on the growth of the economies of Algeria, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and the UAE. The significant and positive effects exist for 
the first period for Syria. Even though the contemporaneous effect is negative and 
insignificant for Oman, the positive effect of oil on growth after the second period 
persists. Observing that higher oil prices increase output for those oil-exporting 
countries is parallel to the expectations. As it is considered a net oil-exporting 
country, it is puzzling that estimates from Bahrain do not reveal positive and sta-
tistically significant effects on output. This result could be attributed to its rela-
tively low scale of output with respect to its high crude oil imports (the oil-import 
over oil-production rate is 7.75 between 1996 and 2000), and its relatively low 
capacity to export (Bahrain’s NOI/GDP ratio is just above that of Egypt). Bahrain 
is also dependent on Saudi Arabia for oil granted as aid (see World Fact Book, 
2007). All these factors make it difficult to observe the oil price-income relation-
ship for Bahrain. 
On other economies -– Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tu-
nisia – the oil price shocks cause positive but not statistically significant effects on 
output. Note that these are mostly oil-importing or small oil-exporting countries. 
Evidence for Egypt and Tunisia may make sense as they are still marginally net 
oil-exporting countries, but evidence on others is puzzling. One may interpret this 
as evidence of the possible non-linearity of the relationship between oil prices and 
economic performance. This is something that we will elaborate on in the follow-
ing sub-sections.
Panel C of Table 4 reports the contemporaneous impact on income for 
each country of one standard deviation shock to oil prices. It is clear that there 
is a strong relationship between oil dependence (Table 3) and contemporaneous 
effects; the correlation coefficient between the OE/OP and the contemporaneous 
effect is 40% and the correlation between NOI/GDP and the contemporaneous 
effect is 48%. Of all the countries, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and 
the UAE, which are prominent oil producers, tend to be affected by oil price 
shocks mostly in the period when the shock occurs. When the OE/OP ratios are 
compared, on average, the countries that have a non-statistically significant effect 
on growth have lower ratios than the more-affected countries do. One country 
may export one type of oil (for example, low quality) and import another type of 
oil (e.g., high quality). Thus, next we look at NOI/GDP, which takes this into ac-
count. A similar strong association between contemporaneous impulse responses 
and the NOI/GDP ratios is also observed.
Our VAR analysis also includes real exchange rate and inflation. The 
empirical evidence provided from the benchmark specification suggests that cur-
rency appreciates in a statistically significant fashion for Oman and the UAE (not 
reported here to save space). Both of these countries are net oil exporting, with 
a relatively big oil sector in their respective economies. Currency appreciates for 
Iran, Kuwait, Syria, and Tunisia but these effects are not statistically significant. 
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For the remaining countries, oil prices depreciate the currency but the effect is not 
statistically significant. One needs to be cautious about the exchange rate effects 
of oil price shocks because the effect may depend on the exchange rate regime, 
and the willingness of central banks to use their exchange reserves for a share of 
oil during international trade transactions. The existing empirical evidence on the 
effects of oil price increases on local currency is mixed for oil-importing coun-
tries, but local currency does appreciate with oil price increases for oil-importing 
countries9. Appreciation of the local currency, as argued by Kamin and Rogers 
(2000), may further stimulate an economy. One may elaborate on the role of the 
real exchange rate as a transmission mechanism for oil shocks on output and infla-
tion, but we did not explore this issue in the current study.
4.1. Non-Linear/Asymmetric Effects10
Non-linearity or asymmetry for the relationship between oil prices and 
output could be a reason for finding the positive (but non-statistically significant) 
relationship between the two series for net oil importing and non-major-oil-ex-
porting countries such as Djibouti, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and 
Tunisia. 
The non-linearity between oil prices and output is explicitly elaborated 
on in the literature. As a way to address non-linearity, Cuñado and de Gracia 
(2003) analyze the effect of oil price changes by looking at the asymmetric effect 
of oil price changes on output for a set of European countries. Following the exist-
ing literature, they measure oil prices in four different ways. These four methods 
are: oil price growth from four quarters earlier; only the positive of these growths; 
maximum growth level of oil prices compared to one, two, three, and four years 
prior; and the positive standardized oil price shocks with the conditional standard 
deviation that comes from the GARCH (1,1) specification. They provide the evi-
dence that (i) oil price increases lower the output but the evidence for oil price 
decreases on output is not statistically significant and (ii) oil price shocks’ effect 
on output is higher when oil prices are more stable than when they are more vola-
tile. Their results suggest non-linear relationship(s) may exist between oil prices 
and output.
In a later study, Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) extend the pre-
vious study by including Norway (a net oil-exporting European country) and a 
set of non-European countries including Canada, Japan, and the US. They also 
consider positive as well as negative standardized oil shocks to the analyses. They 
9. For example, when oil prices increased, Amano and Van Norden (1995) found appreciation 
for Germany, Japan, and the US, however, Maeso-Fernandez et al. (2002), Jiménez-Rodríguez and 
Sánchez (2005) and Chen and Chen (2007) showed that a rise in real oil prices led to a depreciation 
of the real exchange rate for G7 countries. On the other hand, Golub (1983), Corden (1984) and De 
Grauwe (1996) reported the appreciation of the local currency for oil-exporting countries.
10. These estimates are not reported here in order to save space. These estimates and other 
estimates that are not reported in the manuscript are available at http://nukhetdog.googlepages.com/
supplement_01.pdf or from the authors upon request. 
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find that the effect of oil-price rise on output decline is higher than the effect of 
oil-price fall on output increase. With the oil-exporting countries in their sample 
(Norway and the UK), oil price increases favorably affect Norway but adversely 
affect the UK. 
In order to partially address the misspecification functional form, follow-
ing Lee, Ni and Ratti (1995), Hamilton (1996), Cuñado and de Gracia (2003), and 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005), we consider a set of specification that 
allows non-linearity. We adopted classes of non-linear models such that the model 
specifications are the same across countries and thus comparison of the estimates 
are feasible.11 For the seven countries that we examine, in particular, positive and 
statistically significant evidence on Syria remains mostly robust. For Egypt and 
Tunisia, in the contemporaneous period and only when the standardized negative 
oil price shocks are considered, were the effects statistically significant. The evi-
dence from these two countries was not statistically significant in our benchmark 
specification. For the estimates of the four remaining countries - Djibouti, Israel, 
Jordan, and Morocco - the evidence was not statistically significant for the four 
general classes of specification that we consider. Lastly, when they were statisti-
cally significant under the benchmark specification in our paper (all of them are 
net oil-exporting countries), compared to the nonlinear model specifications our 
estimates were robust. 
4.2. Robustness Analyses
In this sub-section, in order to validate our specification, we will discuss 
a set of estimates that we perform for the robustness of our inferences. Firstly, 
a four-variable VAR setup might be too much to ask from the data as its time 
span is too short for some countries. Therefore, our model could be considered 
as over-parameterized. In order to account for this, we consider a two-variable 
set up: oil price growth and the individual country’s growth. We assume that oil 
price growth follows its own dynamics as in our SVAR specification, and that the 
second variable, an individual country’s growth, follows its own lags as well as oil 
price growth and the lag value of oil price growth. The countries that have posi-
tive and statistically significant contemporaneous effects of growth to oil price 
shocks (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and the UAE) in our benchmark 
specification are still positive and significant in the two-variable model. For the 
country that has a positive and significant effect (Syria) in the first period of the 
benchmark model, the result is still positive and significant in the first period. In 
the benchmark specification, the oil price shock was positive and significant after 
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the first period for Oman, but the evidence is not significant when we perform the 
analysis with two variables. Among the estimates that are reported as statistically 
insignificant, the results on Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia are robust but 
others change slightly. 
One may also suggest that oil price shocks may not capture the real ex-
ogenous influence stemming from global macroeconomic developments. In order 
to account for this, as a second robustness specification we include the world GDP 
growth as an exogenous variable to the SVAR system. For the set of countries 
where contemporaneous positive and statistically significant effects are observed 
(Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, and the UAE), the results are robust. 
The effect of an oil shock on Omani output was statistically significant after 
the first period in our benchmark model, but when we include the world output 
growth, the effect is statistically significant only for the second period. Moreover, 
when we include the world output growth, the effect on the Syrian output is no 
longer statistically significant. 
For the third specification, measuring real oil price by using world oil 
prices in US dollars and deflating by the US CPI may not capture the oil price’s 
effect in a domestic economy. One may also convert the dollar price of oil into 
domestic currency with a local exchange rate and then deflate by the country’s 
CPI. However, the second method would allow domestic shocks that affect the 
domestic exchange rate to also affect the real oil price measure of a country. This 
method cannot be considered an exogenous shock that stems from the oil prices 
to an economy. This problem can be practically solved by putting the exchange 
rate before the real oil prices and requiring conventional VAR model estimation 
rather than SVAR, as elaborated in the methodology section. Nevertheless, we 
estimate the specification, and while most of the results are robust with our esti-
mates, the estimates from Kuwait and Djibouti cannot be gathered due to perfect 
multi-colinearity. Overall, the results from the benchmark SVARs were basically 
strong, and under the alternative specifications considered in this sub-section, the 
results are either robust or weaker. 
The block-exogeneity assumption for Iran, Iraq, and Kuwait might be in-
appropriate. We estimated the model without block exogeneity as another robust-
ness specification. The p-values of the growth in the oil specification as well as the 
growths in RER and inflation were higher than the conventional 5% level for these 
three countries. Nevertheless, we estimated the impulse responses and the results 
were robust for all three countries. Bayesian Information Criteria suggested a lag 
length of one for the benchmark SVA specification. We tested the autocorrelation 
for each equation for each country if the residuals were uncorrelated. None of the 
Q-statistics are significant at the 5% level for the growth equation. Therefore, we 
kept the lag order as one. However, when we looked at the autocorrelation for the 
other equations (Real Exchange Rate and Inflation), we observed some degree of 
autocorrelation for Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, and Tunisia. We performed the 
analysis with the extended lags as a fifth set of robustness specification, with the 
result that autocorrelation disappeared for these countries. The statistical evidence 
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for the effect of oil prices on growth, similar to the benchmark model, was not 
statistically significant for Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, or Tunisia. Moreover, simi-
lar to the benchmark specification, impulse responses for Iraq were positive and 
statistically significant contemporaneously only.
Most of the studies that assess the effect of oil prices on economic per-
formance are for industrial countries and they use quarterly data. Quarterly data is 
also used as a last set of robustness specification to assess the relationship between 
oil prices and growth in two ways. In the first set of estimates, we were able to 
gather quarterly data only from Iran, Israel, and Jordan. In these countries, output 
seems to increase contemporaneously with oil prices. The result for Iran is paral-
lel to the benchmark annual specification, and for Jordan, stronger. On the other 
hand, the estimates are not parallel to expectations that output decreases with oil 
price increases. In the second set, we used interpolated data for the remaining 
countries; the estimates had wide confidence bands and none of the estimates was 
statistically significant.
4.3. Caveats
Due to data availability, in order to calculate the real output data, nomi-
nal GDP figures are deflated by either the CPI or a GDP deflator. Bryan and 
Cecchetti (1993) and The Boskin Commission Report (1996) argue that the CPI 
overestimates true inflation. After the Boskin Commission report, the CPI was 
overhauled and the upward bias was corrected for the USA. However, Gordon 
and van Goethem (2005) argue that even after the overhaul, a significant upward 
as well as a downward bias remained. If there is an upward bias for the countries 
that we consider, then this makes the CPI-deflated real output lower compare 
to the GDP-deflated output, and the estimated parameter of real GDP will be 
higher. Thus, comparability of results across countries is difficult. For example, 
oil producers for whom inflation is measured by CPI are not as influenced by oil 
shocks as when measured by a GDP deflator. This makes it difficult to compare 
the impulse responses of the real output to the oil price disturbance, especially for 
oil producers. For the latter countries, taking the best measure of the real GDP de-
flated by a GDP deflator as a benchmark, deflating by CPI should yield an upward 
bias in the estimate of real output effects of oil shocks. Therefore, using both CPIs 
and GDP deflators as a deflator for different countries is a limiting factor in the 
comparability of results across countries.
4.4. Estimates on Oil-Importing Countries
It is important to recognize that the effects of oil price increases on out-
put growth of individual countries are mostly positive. We do not find negative 
and statistically significant effects of oil price shocks on the output growth even 
for oil-importing countries. Not finding these effects of oil price increases on oil-
importing countries does not contradict the existing literature. Bernanke et al. 
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(1997, p. 94) write that “it is surprisingly difficult to find an indicator of oil price 
shocks that produces the expected responses of macroeconomic and policy vari-
ables in a VAR setting.” Mountford (2005) found that positive oil shocks (even 
non-significant ones) increase output for two periods in the UK. Similarly, Hooker 
(1996) argues that after 1973, oil prices no longer Granger causes to output and 
Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) observed that Japanese output increases 
with oil shocks. Jiménez-Rodriguez (2008) also argues that even if “[a]n oil price 
increase lowers the level of aggregate manufacturing output in all countries under 
study ... [t]his similarity of response is, however, unclear when we consider the 
eight industry groups within manufacturing.” She observes that textile, wearing 
apparel, and leather industry output increases for France, Germany, and Spain 
with positive oil price shocks. However, this does not mean that adverse effects of 
oil price shocks for growth are not present. 
Lippi and Nobili (2008) maintain that the source of oil shocks may affect 
economic performance differently; to be specific, oil price increases due to higher 
oil demand shocks affect output differently than oil price increases due to lower 
world oil supply shocks. They argued that positive oil supply shocks decrease 
domestic production. In order to assess the effects of oil supply shocks, we em-
ploy the sign-restrictions approach pioneered by Canova and Nicolo (2002) and 
Uhlig (2005). We set up a three-variable VAR model that includes world crude oil 
production,12 real price changes, and domestic growth rates. Following Lippi and 
Nobili (2008), we define positive oil supply price shocks such that oil produc-
tion decreases but oil prices increase at the contemporaneous period where no 
additional restrictions are put on for additional periods as well as for their effect 
on output. 
Figure 6 reports the response of output to oil supply shocks; following 
Dedola and Neri (2006) and Uhlig (2005), the median line and dashed lines are for 
the confidence intervals. Positive oil supply shocks decreases output for Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia. These effects are statistically signifi-
cant for at least one year. Even if the contemporaneous effect is positive for Israel, 
this is not significant. The effect is negative and statistically significant in the sec-
ond and third years. The only puzzling result is from Djibouti. Even if the effect 
is not statistically significant, it is positive. The answer may lie in the economic 
structure of the economy. Djibouti’s largest source of economic and commercial 
activity is the French military base. The remainder of the economy is based on 
service activities and centered upon the free port of Djibouti. The country pro-
vides services as both a transit port for the region and an international shipment 
and refueling center. Djibouti has few natural resources and a small industry base. 
Therefore, the country heavily depends on foreign aid to finance development 
projects and support its balance of payments. Moreover, as there is little arable 
farmland, most food must be imported. The small industry base and little agricul-
ture result in the adverse effect that oil supply shocks to the economy is small. In 
12. The world crude oil production information is gathered from Energy Balances of Non-OECD 
Countries, from the OECD. The available data begins after 1983. 
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Figure 6. The Effects of Oil Supply Shock on Output for Oil Importing 
Countries
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Figure 7. The Effects of Oil-Demand Shock on Output for Oil-Importing 
Countries
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addition, the service revenue provided from transshipment may increase with oil 
prices. The above factors make the estimates from Djibouti realistic. Overall, we 
claim that positive oil supply shocks make sense with the economic priorities for 
these seven countries. 
We repeat the above exercise of supply shocks for oil demand shocks. 
The estimates are reported in Figure 7. Oil demand shocks are defined as shocks 
that increase both world oil production and world oil prices. The effect of oil 
demand shocks for oil-importing countries are all positive except for Syria, and 
then only contemporaneously. These effects are statistically significant for all but 
Jordan and Syria, and mostly support the argument that oil demand, not oil sup-
ply shocks are the main reason for the increase (but not significant) in output as 
reported in Figure 5. The reason for the positive effect of oil demand shocks on 
domestic output might be due to higher world growth, which increases oil prices 
and also increases domestic output. Higher world growth may affect domestic 
growth through higher export demand. 
Next, we perform the analyses on the net oil-exporting countries (not 
reported). For oil supply shocks, we observe positive and statistically significant 
output growth for Algeria, Iran, and Qatar. The effect for Libya is positive and for 
Bahrain it is negative, but they are not statistically significant. Lastly, we assess 
the effects of oil demand shocks on oil-exporting countries. The statistically sig-
nificant effects are all positive, which may explain the evidence we had for Libya; 
it seems that not oil supply but oil demand shocks affect the output for Libya.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study analyzes the effects of oil price shocks on 16 selected MENA 
economies: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The 
countries included in this study reflect an oil price-taking character, and the sam-
ple includes both net oil exporters and net oil importers. 
The results of the tests indicate that one standard deviation shock in oil 
prices has a statistically significant and positive effect on the growth of the mostly 
net oil-exporting economies: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Syria, and the UAE. Oil price shocks do not appear to impose statistically sig-
nificant effects on the economies of the other countries: Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. In order to elaborate on the estimates of the 
latter countries, following Uhlig (2005) and Lippi and Nobili (2008), we identify 
the oil shocks as oil demand and oil supply shocks. Overall estimates for the lat-
ter countries suggest that output decreases with positive oil supply shocks but 
output increases with positive oil demand shocks. When we repeat the exercise 
for oil-exporting countries, the output of these countries increases regardless of 
whether oil prices increases are associated with oil demand shocks or oil supply 
shocks. This suggests that understanding the nature of oil shocks (oil demand 
versus oil supply) is critical for policy makers - especially for the policy makers of 
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oil-importing countries. Hunt (2005) argues that if policy makers misunderstand 
the effect of oil price shocks on output and labor and attempt to resist the required 
declines in their real wages, higher oil prices can result in significant disruptions 
to real activity. 
This study limits itself to an analysis of the effects of oil price shocks 
on the growth of the economic activities of selected MENA countries. The re-
sults constitute a small portion of the domain of associations and further studies 
in relation to existing economic structures and the transmission channels of oil 
price movements are required. For example, the effects of oil price shocks on fis-
cal balance, current account, interest rates and real exchange rates could also be 
analyzed. 
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APPENDIx. UNIT ROOT TESTS
Table A1 reports the unit root tests for the logarithm of the real GDP se-
ries for each country and real oil prices. Panel A reports three unit root tests in lev-
els of series with the constant term. Note that the null is the presence of a unit root 
for both of these tests: Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips and Perron Tests; 
rejecting the null indicates the presence of stationary. On the other hand, the null 
hypothesis is the presence of stationary for the Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt, 
and Shin tests; rejecting the null indicates the presence of unit roots. Panel B re-
peats the exercise with the constant term and time trend. Panel C performs the test 
on the series’ first difference with the constant term. Overall, it can be suggested 
that the series are difference stationary, except for Djibouti. 
Panel D reports the Engle and Granger cointegration tests between the 
logarithm of each country’s GDP and real oil prices. Overall, we could not detect 
the presence of cointegration in each pair of variables at the 5% level, except for 
Jordan.
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